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Introduction
The speakers at the conference identified that there
is a fundamental disconnect between what we see
in company accounts and what is happening in
capital markets. Anne Wyatt’s presentation did a
good job of looking at all of the literature in this
area, and further identified other work that can be
done.
As accounting moves towards a more balance
sheet centric view of a company, internally-gener-
ated intangibles represent the key difference be-
tween book value and the market value. These
items can be allocated to a wide range of cate-
gories including goodwill, brand value, patents, re-
search and development (R&D), workforce
know-how, etc. The presenters to date have main-
ly been of the opinion that we should not put all of
those things on the balance sheet, as they are hard
to analyse, and their reliability in particular is un-
clear. But are accounts true and fair despite this? I
think the key question is rather: ‘Do analysts get
the information they need to value companies
properly and can it be improved?’
In the context of organic intangibles, I am very
sorry to have to tell anyone that is a great support-
er of full fair value of all items on the balance
sheet, that I have never heard a financial analyst at
two o’clock in the morning, working on their
spreadsheet, trying to conclude whether to buy or
sell shares of the company, saying: ‘God, if only
the accountants had given me the answer, I could
have gone home six hours ago’. Indeed, if all of
those intangible values were starting to appear on
the books, I think they would argue that it would
actually obfuscate the situation. The reason for this
is that current intangible accounting is already
weak and there are enormous problems associated
with allocating value between the different intan-
gibles and, indeed, identifying the appropriate units
of account for many tangible assets.
To keep the paper to a manageable length, I will
just point to three areas of accounting where we al-
ready have intangibles, where I do not think cur-
rent accounting standards work: goodwill, internal
intangibles (capitalisation of development costs),
and accounting for acquired intangibles.
Goodwill
The issue here is that the identification of impair-
ment cannot be rigorously tested or analysed. In
my view, goodwill absolutely should go on the
books of companies, and it should be looked at for
impairment. Management is accountable for the
price they pay to acquire another business, and in
order to measure a return on invested capital we
need to be able to look at the totality of what they
have spent. This necessitates carrying goodwill for
as long as management believe that they will earn
an adequate return on the investment, followed by
a charge against that goodwill if they determine
that they have overpaid. The problem is it often
takes new management to admit to past mistakes.
So it can be quite a long time before we start to see
the impact of goodwill that should have been im-
paired finally making it through the accounts.
Vodafone was a classic example of this. The ac-
quisition of Mannesman and large payments for
UMTS licenses had resulted in very significant in-
tangibles being put on the balance sheet of the
company. Initially, during the ‘TMT Bubble’, the
market assumed that this value was reasonable and
the shares traded at a premium to book value.
Vodafone suffered in the ensuing bear market as
people realised that they had paid far too much for
these assets and the shares traded at a significant
discount to reported book values, with analysts ex-
plaining why the book values could not earn their
cost of capital. It was not until 2006, however,
when they took a £23.5bn write-down that price-
to-book trended back towards parity and more 
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recently above. So the accounts had finally caught
up.
This clearly illustrates the fundamental discon-
nect between accounting and capital markets as it
took the management and their accountants five
years to reflect market reality in the accounts and,
in retrospect, earlier ‘reality’ in the TMT bubble
had been wrong anyway.
Internal intangibles
The table above illustrates the accounting for de-
velopment costs for three major car companies.
IAS 38 was hoped to bring us some clarity through
greater disclosure and commonality of capitalisa-
tion for this development expenditure. If done
well, we would lose the divergence in accounting
practice and company accounts would become
more comparable, a huge potential benefit for an-
alysts who often focus more on comparison of
stocks in their coverage rather than assessing ab-
solute value. 
As the table shows the reality has been that we
have ended up with every analyst having a signif-
icantly more complicated spreadsheet, because
they now have to work out what was the total
R&D cash spend, how much they have capitalised,
the impact on operating profit this year, and how
this has changed from one year to the next. As you
can see here, the practice does give some strange
messages. For example, BMW has gone from cap-
italising 39% of their total R&D spend in 2003 to
45% in 2005; Volkswagen has gone from 44% to
35%; and Renault from 30% to 37%. The propor-
tion of R&D capitalised as a per cent of sales for
those three businesses has gone from 2.4% to 3.0%
for BMW, 2.1% to 1.5% for Volkswagen and 1.5%
to 2.0% for Renault. These changes can cause
wide divergences between profits from one year to
the next and can widen the gap between cash flow
and reported profits.
This divergence would be fine if we could
analyse in detail what was going on and see a rela-
tionship between the development programmes
and spikes in R&D spending because of a new
product that is about to be launched and revenues
generated later. This is the strength of accounting
where we see matching of the expenditure and rev-
enues in the income statement. But the reality is,
thus far, we are unable to see a significant linkage
in that area and analysis suggests that R&D cash
flows are more stable than expenditure recognised
through the income statement. This can be con-
trasted with capital expenditure and the associated
depreciation expense where we see more pre-
dictable expenditure in the income statement than
in cash flow.
Acquired intangible assets
When analysing non-goodwill acquired intangible
assets that appear on the balance sheet, I break
them down into two types: a group that I would de-
scribe as wasting assets and a group that I would
describe as organically replaced assets. The wast-
ing assets are the standard ones we might think
about – patents or publishing rights. For most of
these assets you can make fairly reliable estimates
of the fair value. If it is a pharmaceutical company
buying a patent, you can predict sales, how much
it will cost you to market it and so forth, and you
can come up with a value. You also know when
that patent is going to expire because it has a finite
life. You can therefore assess an appropriate
charge for the income statement that reflects the
diminution in value of the asset as it wastes.
Current accounting is appropriate for these assets.
Organically replaced assets are a little bit more
complicated, and customer lists are my specific
‘bugbear’. If you look at the customer list that the
business actually acquired, it will be a wasting
asset: those same customers over a period of time
will rotate off. Nevertheless, companies will or-
ganically continue to spend money on marketing,
promotion and their sales force with these costs
charged through their income statement. Their aim
will be to at least maintain or hopefully grow their
customer list organically replacing those which
have wasted. The impact of current accounting is
that you have a ‘double whammy’ in the income
statement. There is a charge for the cost of main-
taining that asset and you are charging amortisa-
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BMW Volkswagen Renault
2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
EBITDA margin reported 13.8% 14.5% 14.6% 11.6% 11.3% 12.0% 9.2% 10.8% 9.7%
Operating margin reported 8.1% 8.4% 8.1% 1.9% 1.8% 2.9% 3.3% 5.3% 3.2%
R&D % capitalised 39% 40% 45% 44% 36% 35% 30% 38% 37%
R&D cap/sales 2.4% 2.5% 3.0% 2.1% 1.7% 1.5% 1.5% 1.8% 2.0%
EBITDA margin all expensed 11.4% 11.9% 11.6% 9.4% 9.6% 10.5% 7.7% 9.0% 7.7%
Operating margin all expensed 7.1% 7.4% 6.7% 1.4% 1.4% 2.9% 2.5% 4.6% 2.6%









































tion against the value of the acquired asset. The re-
ality of where we are in accounting today is that
accounting standards force companies over a peri-
od of time to fade their businesses to look as if
they had not grown by acquisition, whereas in re-
ality they have, and we gradually lose sight of the
assets that they bought against which we should be
able to hold them accountable for generating a re-
turn. 
To illustrate the issue, I will make some com-
ments about Reed Elsevier but only because their
disclosure is clearer than most. The company has
made a significant number of acquisitions over the
years and analysts tend to ignore the amortisation
of acquired intangibles, when calculating their un-
derlying performance, as the organically replaced
assets are generally the most common component.
Indeed, Reed Elsevier reports an adjusted operat-
ing profit number that is pretty compliant with
what analysts tell them they want to see: operating
profit before the amortisation of acquired intangi-
ble assets, and before any non-recurring items. 
In 2006 a review of the accounts shows a £297m
adjustment for acquired intangibles, 24% of their
adjusted operating profit of £1.2bn. Included in
this amount was £191m, or almost 70%, which re-
lated to content and software. It is quite likely that
a proportion of these assets may indeed be wasting
in nature. We cannot, from this disclosure, identi-
fy how much organic expense they are incurring to
maintain some of the value of the content or in-
deed update and improve it, which is critical in de-
termining the appropriate treatment to reflect the
underlying economics. 
For many companies, management remunera-
tion is often linked to the adjusted profits number
rather than the reported number. This might affect
management decision making as they might con-
clude it is better to go out and buy content rather
than develop it internally, because the cost of that
content will go against an amortisation number
that will be added back for adjusted earnings. As I
mentioned before, I have used Reed Elsevier as
their disclosure is clear and in their case, manage-
ment have been very open when they make acqui-
sitions about the value that they expect to generate.
This is not always the case and accounting for in-
tangibles arising through acquisitions can create
problems for analysts.
Conclusion
Balance sheets need not reflect the economic or
fair value of the operations for analysts and other
users to reach valid conclusions when looking at a
set of accounts. What is important is that we un-
derstand the operational transactions that have
taken place in order that we identify what profits
the management have actually earned utilising the
operational capital that they have invested, organ-
ically or by acquisition. This is the ‘operational
stewardship’ role of management.
‘Financial stewardship’ is slightly different. In
this case we are looking at how management have
performed with respect to the financial exposures
of the enterprise as these can also impact on share-
holder value. I am generally more supportive of
using fair value for these items, which would in-
clude pensions.
One thing to think about when we are looking at
this gap between capital market values and finan-
cial statements is that a level 1 valuation – the best
valuation you can get – already exists for the ag-
gregate intangibles for a business. The market cap
at the year-end minus the tangible book value
could be used as the value of the intangibles. There
just follows an exercise in attribution of that value
between the different sorts of intangible assets.
The problem is that the component parts are com-
pletely subjective and I would argue that there is
little point in paying valuers to make this attribu-
tion. I can illustrate this by simply taking the value
of a brand. How much is genuine brand value,
where customers perceive a benefit from the
brand; and how much of it could be simply cus-
tomer inertia? You just need to think about your
own relationship with your telecommunications
provider or your bank. How much of the reason
that you stay with the same provider is because it
is just too much hassle to change, and how much
is it because there genuinely is brand value in that
business? That does not mean to say that customer
inertia (‘customer lists’), can protect you and has
long-term value, as Northern Rock recently dis-
covered!
I should also point out that the attribution exer-
cise is even more complicated than I have illus-
trated above, where I assumed that the tangible
book value is a known quantity. In reality, if we
move towards fair value of operating activities, the
unit of account or valuation methodology can have
a huge impact on the value of the tangible assets
too. To illustrate: if we take the value of a factory,
is the fair value the sum of the value of the land,
buildings and each piece of equipment at replace-
ment cost or is it the net present value of the cash
flows arising from the production activities or
even the expected disposal value on liquidation?
Depending on what you choose, values will show
wide divergence and the larger the unit of account,
the greater the dependence on layers of assump-
tions which cannot really be tested. It would also
mean that users would lose sight of the capital that
management have invested upon which they are
expected to generate a return. This would lead to a
very unsatisfactory outcome and few could argue
that the financial statements would be very ‘value
relevant’ or informative despite the price-to-book
being closer to one.









































Some observers would argue that financial state-
ments should reflect all the movements in fair 
values as this more accurately reflects the per-
formance of management from one year to the
next, measuring the success of brand building or a
successful new project being completed that will
deliver returns for many years. I would dispute the
idea that this needs to be displayed in the financial
statements, as capital markets always find a way to
solve these issues. In this case the way that most
businesses do it, is by ensuring that management
has a significant proportion of their bonus and
other compensation linked to total shareholder re-
turns, often through share option participation and
so forth. The returns maximising strategy for man-
agement will often be to grow the intangible value
and communicate with their shareholders why
their actions have increased the net present value
of the business via improved customer retention,
higher brand values, better training of their staff,
richer pipeline of new products and so forth. Such
communication in the management commentary
should be encouraged. I know it is an area that the
IASB will look at in time and believe that this is an
important project to make sure users get enough
information to enable them to more accurately
value businesses but I do not think that the right
place to carry the value of the business is in the
balance sheet.
The question is: ‘What is value-relevant?’ To an-
swer the question, we looked at the level of the
S&P 500 compared to reported S&P 500 EPS
going back over the last 130 years. This analysis
gave us an R2 of 96% over this period, which
seems to indicate that ‘earnings’ are value-rele-
vant. I appreciate that defining earnings is com-
plex but most analysts, investment banks and fund
management groups that I talk to have a very sim-
ilar view on what constitutes earnings that they are
‘prepared to put a multiple on’. The IASB should
focus on giving us earnings numbers, robustly de-
fined and clearly presented.
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